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Energy Security and the OSCE 
The Case for Energy Risk Mitigation and Connectivity 
Indra Øverland, Ellen Scholl, Kirsten Westphal and Katja Yafimava 
The 2016 German Chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) comes at a time of increasing awareness about the interdependence 
between energy security and hard, economic, and human security. Energy risks are 
endemic in the OSCE area. Because these risks have an impact on regional security, 
there are good reasons for the OSCE to assume a stronger role in addressing energy 
security issues and reducing energy risks in the OSCE area. In so doing, the OSCE can 
utilise its existing capabilities in the areas of awareness-raising, early warning, pre-
vention, mitigation, and crisis management and can build on its missions, tools, and 
field presence. Furthermore, the OSCE’s focus on connectivity can contribute towards 
reducing energy risks arising from outdated or insufficient infrastructure by address-
ing physical connectivity jointly with legal and regulatory compatibility to improve 
the investment climate and foster stable policy frameworks. 
 
Cooperation on energy security in Europe 
has become a pressing issue amid the 
deterioration of relations between Russia 
and the West in the aftermath of Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and destabilisation 
in eastern Ukraine, which have drawn 
renewed attention to energy-security risks. 
A mapping of energy conflicts carried out 
for this paper demonstrates that the risks 
are not limited to Ukraine but are wide-
spread across the OSCE area. Most of these 
conflicts are of a cross-border nature, thus 
involving two or more countries (often non-
OSCE and OSCE), and the vast majority 
have regional implications. The challenges 
related to energy are not only cross-border 
but also multifaceted. Energy is first and 
foremost a field of cooperation but can also 
be either a cause of risk or itself at risk, as 
well as a cause or consequence of geopoliti-
cal turmoil. 
Critical Energy Risks in the 
OSCE Area 
Within the OSCE area, natural gas trade 
via pipeline is most closely associated with 
conflict, followed by electricity trade. This 
is cause for concern, as the fixed nature 
of infrastructure and market sensitivity re-
quire stable and reliable relations between 
parties often interlocked in interdependent 
relationships, underpinned by long-term 
contracts and/or intergovernmental agree-
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ments. The link between these types of 
energy relations and conflict is also salient 
from a humanitarian perspective, as elec-
tricity and natural gas are vital to provide 
basic services such as lighting, heating, and 
cooling and to maintain a robust economy. 
Energy flows crossing multiple borders, 
jurisdictions, conflict zones, or disputed 
areas are also a source of tension. Energy 
risks can be found along the fault lines 
of different jurisdictions and regulatory 
regimes or in areas where different regu-
latory, legal, and/or contractual regimes 
overlap and potentially come into conflict. 
In the absence of an overarching multilat-
eral regulatory framework, pipeline gas 
trade across multiple jurisdictions can 
falter in the event of a bilateral political 
and contractual breakdown, potentially 
resulting in the interruption of gas supply 
and/or transit flows. 
Rapid changes in energy markets and 
price levels are also sources of tension. This 
is true of changes in legal and political 
frameworks, as newly-designed frameworks 
can create unique challenges for public- 
and private-sector actors alike, particularly 
with regard to investment climate stability. 
Transformation of energy markets and sys-
tems can cause unpredictability and uncer-
tainty, as evidenced by several European 
countries, including Germany, which im-
plemented policy changes to phase out nu-
clear power, or Spain, which rescinded pre-
vious policy support for renewable energy. 
The security of critical infrastructure, wheth-
er from physical or cyber-attack, is a con-
cern for many OSCE countries, including 
the United States, Kazakhstan, Turkey, 
and Ukraine, among others. This risk is fre-
quently realised, as evidenced by attacks 
on pipelines and power lines. Examples in-
clude the August 2015 explosions along the 
South Caucasus gas pipeline in Turkey; the 
November 2015 blasting of power pylons in 
Ukraine, which caused lasting power cuts in 
Crimea; and the first assumed cyber-induced 
power grid blackout, in western Ukraine in 
December 2015. NATO has warned that ener-
gy makes a “tempting target” in hybrid war-
fare, both for the second- and third-order 
devastation brought by targeting energy 
facilities and the possibility of using the 
provision or withholding of energy services 
as a tool of coercion or legitimation. 
Meanwhile, the issue of regulatory fault 
lines is less understood but perhaps more 
prevalent, as it involves misunderstandings 
and disputes when different legal, regu-
latory, and contractual spaces overlap and 
are potentially in conflict, or when entities 
fall outside existing regulatory and contrac-
tual spaces. This is particularly salient in the 
EU and Russia’s common neighbourhood, 
where neither EU nor Russian law applies 
or is properly implemented and enforced, 
or where competitive energy regionalism 
between the EU/Energy Community and the 
Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union looms. 
Concrete problems include incompatibility 
of system operation codes, voltages and fre-
quencies, tariff structures, capacity alloca-
tion mechanisms, congestion management 
procedures, and other technical issues, along 
with different operational procedures, or-
ganisational structures, and working defini-
tions. These incompatibilities may result 
in commercial and/or technical disputes, 
which can have a negative impact on 
broader security issues. 
The issue of pipeline politics encompasses a 
broad geographical area, and projects such 
as BTC, South Stream, and Nord Stream 1 
and 2 have often been the subjects of heated 
political debate. Pipeline politics includes 
both the long-term risks associated with 
infrastructure projects spanning multiple 
countries and jurisdictions, and geopoliti-
cal manoeuvring over where pipelines 
should be located. It also includes risks 
associated with pipeline ownership, trans-
mission, and distribution of energy through 
fixed infrastructure, in particular the per-
ceived ability to use pipeline transit as a 
source of political or commercial leverage. 
These risks are relevant both for existing 
and future or planned projects. 
Although there is awareness of many 
territorial, jurisdictional, and ownership disputes, 
the role of energy in these disputes is often 
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less understood. However, energy conflicts 
can cause – or result from – these disputes, 
and can exacerbate existing tensions or con-
tribute towards their resolution. The degree 
to which energy resources and infrastruc-
ture can become intertwined in territorial 
disputes is evident in conflicting claims by 
littoral states over maritime boundaries 
and resources in the Caspian Sea region. En-
ergy is also relevant in so-called “frozen” or 
semi-“frozen” conflicts, for example the on-
going disputes over Transnistria and Nagor-
no-Karabakh, which impact the security of 
energy transit via pipeline and the viability 
of new transport options. In extreme cases, 
energy can even be used in hybrid warfare. 
However, there is also potential for energy 
to provide grounds for cooperation and 
contribute to thawing a conflict. 
Although the four abovementioned cat-
egories encompass some of the most press-
ing energy risks – and hence should be pri-
oritised – the list is not exhaustive. Energy 
risks are numerous across the OSCE area, 
including those emanating from poor grid 
interconnections; trade, policy, and invest-
ment disputes; environmental disputes; 
domestic energy market governance and do-
mestic politics (including resource nation-
alism and corruption); energy in warfare, 
and risks unique to Western sanctions and 
Russian countersanctions. All of these are 
also important and should be addressed. 
A Gap for the OSCE to Fill 
The OSCE has evolved out of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) process as a platform for cautious 
mediation of the relations between the two 
blocs of the Cold War. Although not quite 
at Cold War lows, relations between Russia 
and the West in the aftermath of the 2014 
Ukraine crisis have become more strained 
than at any point since the end of the Cold 
War, underscoring the need for such a plat-
form, particularly when it comes to energy. 
Thus, Germany’s OSCE Chairmanship takes 
place at a critical and unique moment in his-
tory. The Eurasian political and economic 
landscape has become more complicated, 
with important fault lines emerging inside 
the former Soviet Union territory, while the 
EU is grappling with its own internal issues 
and external relations with its neighbours, 
and North America is exploring the benefits 
of energy self-sufficiency. 
Global developments are transforming 
the energy world and shifting the locus and 
nature of energy production and trade. 
Notably, the emergence of the United States 
as a liquefied natural gas and crude oil 
exporter adds new supply and new dimen-
sions to the global market, whereas the 
Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and 
China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy 
reflect changing regional developments 
and dynamics in Europe and Asia. As the 
world becomes increasingly multi-polar, on 
the one hand energy trade becomes increas-
ingly interconnected, while on the other 
hand the emergence of energy regions 
(“blocs”) with different regulatory regimes 
widens the scope for potential energy con-
flicts. This makes the adaptation of existing 
institutional settings and energy govern-
ance structures capable of addressing these 
risks more urgent. 
In this new energy world, the OSCE is 
uniquely positioned and equipped to play 
a greater role in addressing energy security, 
which would benefit from the attention of 
a multilateral organisation comprised of 57 
states across Europe, North America, and 
Asia. Given its geographic reach, its posi-
tion as a multilateral international organi-
sation, and its historical role as a trusted 
broker – along with its three-pillar (or bas-
ket) structure of politico-military, economic, 
and environmental cooperation – as well as 
the human dimension, the OSCE is ideally 
placed and equipped to assume a stronger 
role when it comes to energy security. 
The OSCE already has a strong track 
record on the sustainable use and manage-
ment of natural resources. The OSCE de-
fined energy security at the 2003 Maastricht 
Meeting of the Ministerial Council as fol-
lows: “a high level of energy security re-
quires a predictable, reliable, economically 
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acceptable, commercially sound and envi-
ronmentally friendly energy supply which 
can be achieved by means of long-term con-
tracts in appropriate cases.” This definition 
was reaffirmed in 2006 and 2009. These 
decisions established the OSCE as a plat-
form for energy security dialogue between 
participating states – a function that has 
thus far been underexploited. Energy secu-
rity has become intertwined with hard, eco-
nomic, and human security in more com-
plex ways than in the past, and there is a 
gap to fill that no other existing institution 
can assume in this area. 
The OSCE’s geographic scope “from Van-
couver to Vladivostok” spans the Northern 
Hemisphere and includes “partner coun-
tries” in North Africa, the Mediterranean, 
and Asia, and encompasses integration pro-
cesses in the EU and the Energy Community, 
the Eurasian Economic Union, and (partially) 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s 
Energy Club and NAFTA. This gives the OSCE 
the advantage of being able to provide a 
forum for dialogue on energy security that 
involves Canada, the EU, Russia, the United 
States, and the states of the Black Sea and 
the Caspian and Central Asian regions as 
participating states with equal rights. 
Although the OSCE cannot provide a 
panacea for all energy security issues, its 
comprehensiveness enables it to serve as a 
neutral platform for dialogue – a role many 
organisations are unable to fill. Unlike the 
EU, the Eurasian Economic Union, the 
International Energy Agency, NATO, and 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
the OSCE includes all countries in the 
region as members and equals. The Energy 
Charter Process is currently too weak, given 
(among other reasons) Russia’s withdrawal 
from the Energy Charter Treaty. 
The EU’s external energy policy is fo-
cussed at exporting its energy acquis commu-
nautaire to non-EU Energy Community coun-
tries, particularly in implementation and 
enforcement of the acquis outside the EU 
borders. Yet, dissemination of regulatory 
“software” has to be reinforced by invest-
ment in infrastructure “hardware” from 
the energy industry. The western Balkan 
countries, Moldova, and Ukraine – all of 
which are contracting parties of the Energy 
Community Treaty– serve as important test 
cases demonstrating the tension between 
the adoption of legal or regulatory prin-
ciples and the realities of system transfor-
mation. In fact, the EU’s transformative role 
in the neighbouring “ring of friends” is 
facing limitations in Eastern Europe and 
the Mediterranean. 
Given the lack of an overarching multi-
lateral regulatory framework governing 
energy across all OSCE parties in Europe 
and in the former Soviet Union, the OSCE 
is perfectly suited to play a role where exist-
ing (or anticipated) energy risks could im-
pact hard, economic, and human security. 
In particular, the OSCE can play a role in 
areas where supranational, national, or 
regional jurisdictions are unclear or con-
flict with one another. The OSCE can help 
to overcome the political and regulatory 
“disconnect” or “discontinuity” between 
political or regulatory areas, bridge fault 
lines, and serve countries that remain out-
side these areas. Even though the OSCE 
lacks a legal personality, it can serve as a 
forum or platform for dialogue and play a 
facilitating role, particularly when involve-
ment of more than two parties is required, 
as in gas discussions between the EU, Rus-
sia, and Ukraine. Despite these strengths, 
the OSCE remains an under-utilized re-
source in international energy governance. 
Germany assumed the OSCE Chairman-
ship on 1 January 2016 for the first time 
since 1991 with the theme of “renewing 
dialogue, rebuilding trust, restoring secu-
rity”. As outlined in its stated priorities, the 
German Chairmanship takes place amid 
“one of the severest crises in Europe’s secu-
rity order since the Cold War” and Germa-
ny aims to “use, maintain, and consolidate 
the OSCE as a cornerstone of European 
security”. The German government intends 
to build on the OSCE’s traditional strengths 
in dialogue and confidence-building as well 
as conflict prevention and management. 
Thus, the German Chairmanship aims at 
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enhancing OSCE capabilities through the 
entire conflict cycle, strengthening the or-
ganisation as a platform for dialogue and 
good governance. Last but not least, the 
German Chairmanship is strongly promot-
ing the theme of connectivity in the wider 
OSCE area. 
Enhancing the OSCE’s Role in 
Energy: Proposals for Action 
Given the unique role the OSCE can play 
in reducing energy-security risks and the 
capabilities it can bring to the table, the 
OSCE should avail itself of its traditional 
toolbox to help raise awareness of these 
risks, engage in early warning, prevention, 
and mitigation, and incorporate energy 
into crisis management. The OSCE can also 
expand and apply its methods, procedures, 
and mechanisms for risk reduction to build 
on its traditional competencies to apply 
confidence-building measures to energy-
sector problems, achieve peaceful dispute 
settlement, and incorporate energy into its 
already strong field presence. The OSCE can 
also incorporate energy into its robust crisis 
management capabilities. Moreover, the 
OSCE can draw on its field presence, as 
energy risks are concentrated in regions 
where the OSCE has missions in the field, 
including the Balkans, Eastern Europe, 
Ukraine, and Central Asia. Ultimately, the 
OSCE should pursue broad cross-cutting 
strategies, relevant across a range of energy 
risks, along with concrete measures to 
specifically address the four critical risk 
categories. 
Cross-Cutting Strategies 
 The OSCE should strengthen its role as a 
forum for energy security dialogue among par-
ticipating states and actively engage in and 
encourage discussion. Such a dialogue 
could begin with exchanging opinions on 
how to define central energy terms (e.g. 
critical infrastructure, regional cross-border 
energy corridors, infrastructure planning) 
to improve understanding and create a 
working vocabulary for cooperation. Based 
on this understanding, energy diplomacy 
could build on common views and solidify 
shared principles on access to critical 
energy services in conflict and the impact 
on human security. 
 To improve its ability to assess and ad-
dress energy risks, the OSCE should develop 
a database identifying energy disputes and map-
ping risks throughout the OSCE area. This 
database could catalogue and map critical 
nodes in energy infrastructure; cross-border 
hotspots, including contractual delivery 
points at borders (flanges); metering points; 
infrastructure bottlenecks; and sensitive 
network nodes relevant for attacks and cas-
cading effects on third-country security. A 
report identifying regulatory cross-border 
fault lines and countries located between 
“energy blocs” could also complement the 
database and mitigate “energy bloc con-
frontation”. A larger OSCE risk assessment 
based on the database could shape OSCE 
energy priorities going forward. 
 The OSCE should also pursue the long-
term goal of developing and disseminating a 
code of conduct. This is not to suggest the 
OSCE should develop new rules, as various 
countries and groups of countries already 
have legally-binding rules governing energy 
issues (e.g. the EU energy acquis communau-
taire). However, the OSCE could develop a 
non-binding code of conduct, or best prac-
tice guidelines outlining general principles 
agreed on by all parties. These principles 
could reflect provisions on energy supply 
and transit included in the Energy Charter 
Treaty, the International Energy Charter, 
or the WTO. The existence of such a code 
could help dissuade parties from making 
arbitrary or unilateral decisions on energy 
supply and transit while preserving their 
national sovereignty. This could also help 
develop a regional energy architecture and 
clarify specific roles to improve coherence 
of action in existing fora. 
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Graphic: Critical Energy Risks and Recommended OSCE Strategies for Engagement 
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 Last but not least, the OSCE could improve 
its long-established field presence by incor-
porating energy considerations in field operations 
and crisis management capabilities. Ongoing 
and future missions could in this case in-
clude energy experts, who could also engage 
in fact-finding missions following a crisis to 
improve the OSCE’s understanding and 
expertise. They could also assist in restoring 
energy flows or maintaining system stabil-
ity in a crisis. 
Targeted Strategies 
 An ex-post evaluation of earlier cases of 
both supply disruption and attack would 
enhance the security of critical energy infra-
structure and inform prevention efforts. 
An information-sharing platform should 
be established to share data about energy 
flows for early warning and crisis manage-
ment purposes along vital energy corridors. 
This would add to the OSCE’s crisis manage-
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ment capabilities and strengthen the under-
standing of energy risks. This mechanism 
would only be activated in emergency 
situations, and would serve to gather infor-
mation on the event, restore flows and sys-
tem stability, and provide lessons to inform 
future crisis prevention efforts. Experts 
could provide recommendations on how 
to increase energy-system resilience. 
To reduce the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure to cyber-attack, the OSCE 
should build on and expand its previous 
work in the Good Practices Guide on Non-
Nuclear Critical Infrastructure Protection 
and serve as a platform for informal in-
formation-sharing on cyber-attacks tar-
geting the energy sector. Such a platform 
could serve as a forum to bring together 
country Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs), whereas the information 
on incidents could remain anonymous and 
non-attributed to a specific company or 
country to ameliorate concerns. A mecha-
nism of codified information-sharing – 
for instance, facilitating exchange by type 
of attack, sector, and network – could en-
hance the OSCE’s role as a trusted broker. 
The OSCE could also convene common 
trainings and simulations, bringing to-
gether technical experts to exchange best 
practices and experiences and build rela-
tionships and networks. Such an exchange 
would build on the OSCE’s nascent work 
in the cyber realm, which includes attack 
simulations and exercises. 
 To address and ameliorate regulatory fault 
lines, the OSCE should create a dialogue plat-
form for experts from regulatory authori-
ties with the aim of establishing a soft-law 
code of conduct for cross-border energy 
flows to ensure compatibility and define 
regulatory roles and functions at each 
border. The long-term goal should be devel-
oping a code of conduct outlining baseline 
compatible regulatory and technical stand-
ards and principles of energy trade. These 
could include: cost-reflectivity of transport 
tariffs; technical and regulatory arrange-
ments for congestion management and 
cross-border capacity allocation; and the 
roles of adjacent regulators in respect of 
cross-border issues. 
 To mitigate the risks related to pipeline 
politics, the OSCE should map existing 
energy corridors and relevant infrastruc-
ture in the OSCE area, and establish a fo-
rum for communication and the exchange 
of appropriate points of contact for each 
corridor. This corridor approach would be 
utilised in the event of a crisis and could 
include information-sharing and common 
emergency response protocols. To mitigate 
risks related to planning future cross-
border infrastructure projects or corridors, 
the OSCE should also establish information-
sharing platforms and communication net-
works. 
 The OSCE should acknowledge and address 
the role of energy in the early phases of ter-
ritorial, jurisdictional, and ownership disputes, 
and bring together public- and private-sec-
tor stakeholders for discussion. It might also 
play a role in issues related to utilisation of 
transboundary oil and gas fields. The Court 
of Conciliation and Arbitration could also 
be engaged. 
In dealing specifically with “frozen” (or 
semi-“frozen”) conflicts, the OSCE can be 
a facilitator for a status-neutral approach 
to ensure continued service provision and 
uninterrupted energy flows in accordance 
with the OSCE’s role in humanitarian issues 
and human security. Such an approach 
would leave aside the status of outstanding 
territorial issues in order to address shared 
energy challenges and enable cooperation. 
This is particularly relevant in military 
conflict or hybrid warfare situations where 
timely restoration of gas or electricity 
supply is paramount in order to prevent 
humanitarian emergency. 
Economic Cooperation and Connec-
tivity As the Second Energy Pillar 
In the presence of functioning energy mar-
kets, the OSCE need not intervene, as ener-
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gy should not be overly securitised. In order 
to strengthen the OSCE’s second dimen-
sion, energy cooperation should be simul-
taneously deepened and enhanced. This is 
both timely and necessary, as all countries 
across the OSCE area face the challenge of 
transforming their energy systems, modern-
ising infrastructure, and attracting invest-
ment against the backdrop of a capital crisis 
in the energy sector. There is also a need for 
political stability and the development of 
markets of scale. Furthermore, energy tran-
sitions will entail a reconfiguration of ener-
gy supply, transport, and consumption pat-
terns, thus creating new energy “geogra-
phies” and, potentially, new energy risks. 
Connectivity should be a guiding prin-
ciple for cooperation, as poor or deficient 
interconnections can be a source of tension 
and endanger system stability. Strengthen-
ing physical connectivity can be achieved 
by jointly addressing legal and regulatory 
compatibility – a necessity for improving 
the investment climate and developing 
markets of scale in the Balkans, the Black 
Sea, the Caspian region, and Central Asia. 
The OSCE should also promote good 
governance – including the sharing of best 
practices in domestic energy regulation – 
in order to build investor confidence. To 
this end, the OSCE could establish a platform, 
bringing together public- and private-sector energy 
stakeholders – including policy-makers, regu-
lators, companies, and financiers – to foster 
the mutual understanding necessary to 
support a robust investment climate and 
foster connectivity. The forum could focus 
on infrastructure improvement and mod-
ernisation – important issues across the 
OSCE area – perhaps in conjunction with 
international financial institutions such as 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB), the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), and the World Bank. Such a 
forum could contribute to market stability 
and predictability and catalyse the invest-
ment needed to build modern and resilient 
energy systems in the OSCE area. 
Conclusion: 
Opportunity amid Change 
In the current context of rapid change and 
manifold energy risks, the OSCE can, and 
should, assume a greater role in addressing 
energy security challenges and fostering 
connectivity in order to strengthen hard, 
economic, and human security in its area. 
There is a gap to fill, and OSCE engagement 
is necessary and should be welcomed if and 
when energy markets malfunction or fail 
and threaten to negatively impact security 
in the OSCE area. Going forward, potential 
cooperation with the Energy Charter Treaty 
Secretariat and the United Nations Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe could be ex-
plored, given past UN willingness to dele-
gate responsibility to the OSCE on contested 
issues as a regional arrangement under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Given that 
energy is crucial for the three pillars of 
OSCE engagement and that it cross-cuts 
hard security, economic security, and human 
security, a failure to address energy-related 
risks could jeopardise all three. 
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